Leo Strauss and the Threat of Moral Relativism

Abstract

Relativism generally, and moral relativism in particular, continue to be topics of philosophical controversy. The controversy arises over general questions about the semantics, epistemology, and logic of the relativist's position. With regard to moral relativism, there are also disagreements about whether moral relativism does not undermine the force of moral claims. Some of these disputes are due to the fact that the disputants differ in the ways they define or understand relativism. Since much of the current controversy about moral relativism has roots in earlier discussions that took place in the twentieth century which have been presented in the works of Leo Strauss, a critical analysis of some of Strauss's views is presented. Relativism was an issue of paramount importance for Strauss, who nevertheless refused to define the object of his concern. Strauss argues that relativism is self-defeating in a manner designated here as <em>the enfeeblement peritrope. </em>Finally, a sketch of how equivocation on the issue of relativism can be avoided by distinguishing the value relativity from parameter parity. It is the latter that is responsible for the enfeeblement that is Strauss's target.